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Bulk Commodities Products

Showing 1-21 of 21 products
Name Trend Price Excl. VAT Date Chg %Chg 48 WK Range
Petcoke
trend
395.9381 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 +4.0177 +1%
48wk range
Scrap
trend
300.5752 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 -1.8496 -1%
48wk range
Fuel Oil
trend
1056.7434 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 -13.7168 -1%
48wk range
Waste Paper
trend
226.1947 USD / MT Nov 13, 2026 -8.9823 -4%
48wk range
Iron Ore
trend
85.8761 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 -1.4867 -2%
48wk range
White Sugar
trend
725.4690 USD / MT Nov 13, 2026 -5.3186 -1%
48wk range
Corn Starch
trend
434.1327 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 +9.1239 +2%
48wk range
Diesel
trend
1204.3982 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 -4.0619 0%
48wk range
Gasoline
trend
1224.1593 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 -4.0708 0%
48wk range
Bitumen
trend
701.0885 USD / MT Nov 13, 2026 -16.9027 -2%
48wk range
LNG
trend
917.6637 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 +0.1239 +0%
48wk range
Hot-rolled Plain Round Steel Wire Rod
trend
439.9381 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 -1.0000 0%
48wk range
Galvanized Steel Sheet
trend
504.0088 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 -0.0619 0%
48wk range
Coke
trend
247.7965 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 +10.5841 +4%
48wk range
Stainless Steel Plate
trend
1706.8850 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 -3.0177 0%
48wk range
Naphtha (petroleum), light alkylate
trend
1093.3274 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 +13.6637 +1%
48wk range
Cotton Yarn
trend
3264.9469 USD / MT Nov 13, 2026 +0.7257 +0%
48wk range
Ferrosilicon
trend
724.9292 USD / MT Nov 16, 2026 +0.0000 +0%
48wk range
Rebar
trend
412.9735 USD / MT Nov 04, 2026 -7.2389 -2%
48wk range
Desulfurized Iron Concentrate Powder
trend
85.9115 USD / MT Mar 27, 2026 -0.1150 -0.13%
48wk range
Pyrite
trend
172.1947 USD / MT Mar 27, 2026 -0.2124 -0.12%
48wk range

FAQ

[Bulk Commodities] Nine years in chemical futures and spot: the most expensive arbitrage lesson I've seen, part two — processing fees can bury you too

People online all say arbitrage is steadier than outright directional trades. That's half true — it's steady in that "the shape of the risk has changed," and it also traps you in that "you think there's no risk anymore." The person below, let's call him J. J entered the industry several years before me. He lived through the era when futures-spot arbitrage was practically free money, and he made plenty from arbitrage too. J's philosophy on arbitrage: only look at the driver, don't worry much about the margin. Because in his eyes, arbitrage is a trade with smaller losses and very low risk — when a driver appears, go for it boldly. Before Spring Festival 2020, a new MTO plant came online in the northwest, and on top of Iran's gas restrictions, methanol spot was very tight. Traders stocked up and spot kept climbing; futures, as the holiday approached, raised margin requirements and longs cut positions, so the board weakened instead. Back and forth, the basis got pulled to above +100 yuan/ton. J figured: Spring Festival is when downstream is at its worst, demand returns after the holiday, inventories still need to keep drawing down, so the futures-spot contango — buy spot, short futures — still has a strong driver. J judged the probability of the basis weakening sharply to be low, so before the holiday he opened a big futures-spot contango position. But right after Spring Festival, the pandemic hit, demand collapsed outright, yet not a single cargo ship bound for port was missing. Inventories couldn't be digested, port stocks were pinned around 1 million tons right at the start of the year, crude oil kept drifting lower, and spot was easy to fall and hard to rise — the basis weakened all the way from above +100 and eventually turned into a negative basis. J came back after the holiday and decisively cut the position, losing over 100 points. Compared with outright trades, he lost far fewer points, but with a big position size it didn't matter — this one trade wiped out all of last year's profits. If the story ended there, it would just be one failed pre-holiday call. What I still remember to this day is what came after. Despite the disastrous start, J was still full of confidence and wanted to make it back. By May, the basis of methanol spot against the 09 futures contract had already reached -100-something. J figured the dock's storage capacity was already full, the goods that could be registered as warehouse receipts were limited, and there were so many shorts in paper cargo (spot for forward delivery) that they'd get squeezed sooner or later. He judged that once the spot side tightened, the basis could move back from -100-something. On top of that, with storage fees at 1.5 yuan/ton/day, a basis of -100-something was only a few dozen yuan in cost away from a risk-free contango, so losses were limited — so he jumped into the futures-spot contango again. When it rains, it pours. By the end of May, because of limited capacity at mainstream warehouses and too many ships stuck at the docks, the warehouses announced, to improve turnover, that storage fees would go from 1.5 yuan/ton/day to 3 yuan/ton/day. The market basis weakened on the news, and J took another huge loss and cut. After the storage fee hike, many chemicals looked like they were offering risk-free contango opportunities, and a lot of people opened positions — only to find that even "risk-free" contango loses money. On one hand, to keep goods moving, warehouses limited the number of warehouse receipts that could be registered, meaning you couldn't register receipts and could only sell your goods into the market. On the other hand, only those with downstream channels who could actually take the goods away could sell at a decent price; those without downstream channels could only do a cargo transfer, and the transfer price was over 100 lower than taking delivery. Plenty of futures-spot speculators with no downstream channels ended up having to cut and walk away.

[Bulk Commodities] Salt Lake Co. is finally almost done filling in the hole!

In the first half of 2026, the company's potassium chloride sales grew about 26% and lithium carbonate sales about 90%. Lithium carbonate sales grew much faster than potassium chloride, mainly because the company acquired a 51% stake in Minmetals Salt Lake for 4.605 billion yuan, with the deal closing at the end of January 2026; at the same time, the 40,000-ton-per-year integrated base lithium salt project reached full production, lifting total lithium salt capacity from about 40,000 tons a year to 98,000 tons a year (Lanke Lithium + Minmetals Salt Lake + the new project). Lithium carbonate prices rebounded sharply, from about 120,000 yuan a ton at the end of 2025 to over 180,000 at this year's peak — a rebound of more than 50%. Salt Lake Co.'s average lithium carbonate selling price in the first half was about 143,000 yuan a ton, while unit cost was only about 24,000 yuan a ton, for a gross margin of 83.46% — the price increase almost entirely turned into profit. The potash business, meanwhile, provides steady cash flow that helps the company ride out lithium downturns. Second, lithium prices pulled back and supply-demand expectations were revised, pressuring the stock. The company's Q2 potassium chloride sales were about 918,000 tons, down noticeably from 1.33 million tons in Q1; Q2 lithium carbonate sales were about 22,300 tons, below the estimated Q2 output of about 29,900 tons — some of the new capacity turned into inventory. On September 3, SMM broadened its inventory statistics (adding traders, battery makers, and sources like lithium from aluminum dross/tungsten slag), and inventory data was revised up in one go from over 70,000 tons to 169,300 tons. With the wider scope, visible inventory rose noticeably, weakening the market's view of low inventories and tight spot supply. In early September, battery-grade lithium carbonate spot was still at 156,000 yuan a ton; by mid-October the main futures contract had fallen below 110,000 (down 11.79% in a single day on October 12), a drop of over 25%–30%. At the same time, peak-season "Golden September" demand came in below expectations. Third, cost control is real strength. For a resource product where you can't control the selling price, cost is the most important factor in a company's competitiveness. The Qarhan Salt Lake covers 5,856 square kilometers, and Salt Lake Co. holds mining rights to about 3,700 square kilometers of it; its potassium chloride reserves account for about 97% of the country's proven reserves, and its lithium chloride, magnesium chloride, and sodium chloride reserves also rank first nationally. Holding large mining areas creates a high resource barrier to entry. Technically, the feedstock for lithium extraction is the old brine (tail liquid) left after potassium extraction, obtained at almost zero cost — equivalent to the potassium chloride business having already borne most of the brine-pumping and solar-evaporation costs, reducing the cost of lithium extraction. For comparison: Salt Lake Co. (Qarhan) has an all-in cost of roughly 31,000–35,000 yuan a ton, the lowest tier among domestic listed companies; Zangge Mining (also in Qarhan) is about 35,000–42,000, slightly higher — Huxiu says Salt Lake is about 4,000–5,000 yuan a ton lower; Jiangxi lepidolite producers (Yongxing Materials and others) are 50,000–70,000, about 60%–100% higher; and those buying spodumene concentrate (some of Ganfeng/Tianqi's capacity) are 60,000–80,000+, about double. As a cross-check, Zangge Mining disclosed that its average lithium carbonate sales cost in the first half of 2025 was about 41,500 yuan a ton, while its selling price was only 67,500, pushing gross margin down to 30.53%; Salt Lake Co., in the same salt lake with similar processes, still keeps its cost a step lower — enough to show its competitiveness.

[Bulk Commodities] Has the price of lithium carbonate bottomed out?

The first time I sensed a lithium battery material shortage came from two pieces of information: ✅ CATL massively expanded production in 2025, adding 96GWh of new capacity for the year, with capacity utilization as high as 96.9%. ✅ Feedback from procurement said raw material supply was continuously tight, and the industry shifted from overcapacity to a supply-demand squeeze. And CATL's recent moves (hiring the former chairman of Zijin Mining and setting up a 30 billion yuan resource platform to lock in lithium/cobalt/nickel globally) make the raw material shortage a done deal—you can feel CATL's nervousness through the screen; the supply gap must be huge. Following this logic, I looked into raw material price changes and lithium battery demand for the next two years, and found many materials could face shortages. First, let's look at the jump from the lowest prices of core lithium battery materials in 2025 to April 2026: Battery-grade lithium carbonate: 59,000 yuan/ton → 170,000–174,000 yuan/ton; increase: 188%–195%; LFP cathode: 30,000–31,000 yuan/ton → 50,000–55,000 yuan/ton; increase: 61%–83%; Anode graphite: 27,500 yuan/ton → 43,000 yuan/ton; increase: 56.4%; 6μm lithium battery copper foil: 17,000 yuan/ton → 21,000–23,000 yuan/ton; increase: 25%–35%; Conventional LFP electrolyte: 17,500 yuan/ton → 29,000–31,000 yuan/ton; increase: 65%–75%; Battery-grade PVDF: 48,500 yuan/ton → 60,000 yuan/ton.