Soda ash and glass broke down through support. As of the close, I still have short positions in caustic soda and coking coal, but they're fairly close to my cost basis, so I plan to see how the evening session goes before deciding whether to hold over the weekend. Yesterday's post covered coking coal, which has been choppy this week; today I'll talk about soda ash and glass, which people ask about a lot but I haven't been involved in. Soda ash and glass hit the resistance levels we discussed these past two days and didn't manage an effective breakout. Soda ash data has shifted recently, so in last night's livestream and today's video I laid out expectations for its trend. Glass pulled back but doesn't have much downside room right now, so whether the trend continues tonight and whether key support breaks is what matters. First, soda ash: earlier the inventory decline was notable and supported sentiment, but the supply contraction logic from concentrated maintenance has completely faded. In early November several soda ash plants restarted and raised output, and industry capacity utilization rebounded quickly. Latest data shows this week's comprehensive soda ash capacity utilization at 75.33%, up a sharp 8.78 percentage points week-on-week, with large-scale enterprises recovering more noticeably and capacity release accelerating; inventories have also completely reversed the earlier destocking trend. As of November 6, total inventory at sample soda ash enterprises nationwide was 1.4128 million tons, up 46,600 tons or 3.41% week-on-week, with heavy soda ash inventory at 624,100 tons, up 32,300 tons. Demand isn't great either: the core downstream float glass is struggling, with production line maintenance continuing and daily melting volume gradually declining, maintaining only rigid purchases of heavy soda ash with low willingness to restock proactively. Solar glass capacity hasn't dropped yet but there's no new commissioning increment ahead. Light soda ash downstream is also in a standalone industry situation with flat end-market transactions, unable to offset the shortfall in intermediate demand. So overall, as soda ash inventory shifts from destocking back to restocking, the market returns to 'oversupply,' and downstream support is basically gone, so I'll stick with the 'short at highs' approach; turning the soda ash trend around would require more than just a bit of inventory shrinkage. In this morning's video I said to first watch for a break of the channel support, then see if the tail session could reach 960; it fell a bit short and closed near that level with shrinking momentum, but moving average support turned into resistance. Tonight I'll use 960 as the signal: if the hourly chart breaks below, look toward the previous low; upside resistance is mainly at 1000, as discussed earlier.
Hit a new high again — sharing a good arbitrage opportunity.
A quick note on today's close. If you've read my earlier posts, you'll know that for chemicals with a big crude-oil link I do the regular spread, but for paraxylene I like doing the reverse spread. With a cancellation month in play, around 200 is the high. November paraxylene plunged straight from around 160 to negative territory a couple of days ago. The 1-2 spread also fell from 200 to around 160.
Personally, though, I prefer butterfly spreads.
I lost money on the December contract, but after it pulled back I stopped out and didn't lose much — it bottomed at 180. After I closed the last five lots I stopped trading it.
Once I stop out a wrong trade, I usually don't touch it again unless it comes back near the high, and only then would I enter with a small position. These past two days the 12-1 spread rose back to a high of 280, so I took a small position and made a little.
I'm still holding the January-to-March butterfly. Earlier I said I closed a third of it at 50, but yesterday it came back to around 80 and I added it back in — pretty accurate, all things considered.
Friends know the chemical industry isn't a linear-growth business — it's a cyclical one driven by supply and demand, profit margins, investment, and capacity. The traditional logic: demand growth pushes prices up, better profits encourage capex, companies' new project investments come online together as capacity, capacity surges and supply outpaces demand, prices fall and profits come under pressure, companies cut or halt production voluntarily or otherwise, or backward capacity gets merged or exits, and supply rebalances. That's the chemical cycle law people often talk about.
The National Bureau of Statistics publishes capacity utilization by industry every quarter, and the figure for raw chemical materials and chemical products shows this cycle law very clearly. In Q1 2020, hit by the pandemic, chemical capacity utilization fell to 69.5%, recovered to 74.2% in Q2 and 77.2% in Q4. In 2021, as the pandemic stabilized and factories resumed work, Q1 utilization was 76.9%, rising to a stage high of 80.0% in Q2, then 77.8% in Q3 and 77.6% in Q4. With utilization and margins soaring, talk of a chemical boom was everywhere, and a wave of new capacity followed. In 2022: 77.7% in Q2, 75.3% in Q3, 76.0% in Q4, averaging 76.7% for the year. The boom people hoped for was short-lived and quickly turned into an adjustment period. The 2023 average was 75.3%; 2024 was a plateau, with quarters at 76.4%, 76.4%, 76.0%, and 76.4%, averaging 76.3%. 2025 weakened noticeably: 73.5% in Q1, 71.9% in Q2, 72.5% in Q3, 74.1% in Q4, only 73.0% for the year. Also starting in 2023, new projects invested in the previous two years began coming online in batches, even more concentrated in 2024 and 2025, and anti-involution policy followed. 2026 keeps weakening: 73.8% in Q1 and just 69.4% in Q2, almost on par with the first pandemic quarter.
These numbers aren't just about production load — they mean China's chemical industry has formally moved from an era of capacity expansion into a stock-competition era decided by cost, efficiency, technology, cash flow, and supply-chain capability. To put it bluntly, if imprecisely: new capacity will still be added, and stock competition can become a fight to the death — companies won't be asking how much profit they make but whether they survive.
First, the 2021 boom was a cycle peak driven by a special supply-demand mismatch. The 2021 boom mainly came from force majeure causing uneven global supply-demand recovery, which led to temporary shortages of key raw materials. When China stabilized the pandemic and resumed work, most overseas regions were still dealing with shutdown plants, port congestion, and poor logistics. On top of that, stimulus policies drove a rapid rebound in domestic consumption and manufacturing demand, and companies quickly shifted from destocking to concentrated restocking.